Science Remembering Apollo I - 50 Yrs Later. OV-099 Challenger Incident 31 Years Later This Day...!

50 Years ago, on January 27th, 1967 Apollo I caught fire on the Launch Pad, taking the lives of Gus Grissom, Ed White and Roger Chaffee. An American Tragedy.


https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/243548-remembering-apollo-disaster-50-years-later



For those faint of death, I'd not advise you to listen to the recording of the crew's open microphone, at the 1:03 mark
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/36/Apollo_One_Recording.ogg

31 Years ago on this day, Jan. 28th, 1986 Challenger fell victim to one Contractor's fatal decision to go for Launch, when advised otherwise. A wait for launch of 24 hours would of resulted in a success....

Noted in italics from this link below, is a flat out lie, the American Public is still being fed. Morton Thiokol's 2 KSC Engineer Program Rep's did refuse to give a 'go for launch' all day prior to the launch (Jan. 27th) until midnight 12pm, the morn of the launch Jan. 28th. Morton Thiokol V.P.'s were flown to the Cape, and over rode and reversed the two Engineer's previous 'no go for launch'. Lockheed the main launch contractor was informed in great depth and detail of a single point failure of there SRB O-Rings under the cold temps present at the Cape. The pressure put upon Morton Thiokol was a death blow to the Astronauts and damn near the program.
http://www.space.com/31760-space-shuttle-challenger-disaster-30-years.html


"The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the O-rings and the joint, and were unaware of the initial written recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 degrees. BULLSHIT LIE

 

...^^^it would be very hard for me to forget either of of those events.

...when the Challenger blew up I was outside working on my Triumph TR6 when the wife who was watching it on TV, started hollering for me to come inside.

...now when Grissom, White and Chaffee perished I was a youngster living about 40 miles away from Cape Kennedy so needless to say it was big news.

 

^^^ the Cape right out your back door; that had to be some heavy local sadness looming in the air for yrs to follow. Seeing Challenger explode was like being electrocuted by the Hoover Dam; while running on air, then having the wind knocked clean out of ya'.

Columbia lost Feb. 1st of 2003, felt a very personal like loss; like the San Andreas had given way in my mind.... couldn't rest until I knew what happened, made for a long week or 2...

 

^^^yeah, I remember Mom, Dad, my Brother and myself watching the countdown sequence on TV and once the liftoff was complete we'd all go outside and watch the vapor trail as the rocket soared higher. This was mainly during the Mercury program and the rockets were not very big but the vapor trail was still visible from 40 miles away.
...in comparison, the Apollo rockets were monsters.

 

I participated in a field trip to Jamestown Virginia and when seeing the replicas of the three ships that brought those colonists it made an Impact. Those ships were the technology of the time but to get on one and ride the Atlantic was the unknown behind a colonists or sea mans trip. There is a parallel between those old ocean excursions and the astronauts of today. They too ride technological craft with an even more sinister unknown. Ten years after that Jamestown trio I found myself on the DMZ in Korea. One of the things we used to do for grins and giggles was to tune into the Broadcasts of our favorite girls Moscow Molly, and Peiping Polly. When that Apollo Mission failed they had some not so kind remarks. My father worked at Cape Kennedy in the late 60's so I heard some stories from his end of the deal. I was watching when the Challenger went up as well feeling that people who are taking those risks need back up untouched by stupidity or carelessness. I take my hat off to those people because the discoveries they make will benefit many upon the arrival of space travel for all.

 

Apollo happened before I was born, but Challenger I watched from the lounge if the Freshmen dorm in college. I had, up to that point watched every launch on TV. I still have a scrapbook I made in grammar school that chronicles every article leading up to the first shuttle launch.

I'm amazed we can't get the record straight about the o rings. It was a fuck up that cost people lives, and loss of both national property and pride. What's worse in my mind was the failure to learn lessons of decision making that led to Columbia accident. Science missions should never be political tools.

 

...yeah, that link that Matts posted about the guy who over-ruled the engineers who had previously ruled "no go" on the launch, came as news to me...incredible fuck up.
...like he said, another 24 hours and things would have been different.

 

I learned that back around the Columbia disaster from some former NASA engineers that worked at SpaceDev. SpaceDev guys also flew in our Tripoli Club when sport rocketry relied on hybrid motors as we were fighting Patriot act limiting access to APCP motors (coincidentally the same type of motor in the shuttle boosters).

 

from "Engineering.com"

The Night Before the Launch
Temperatures for the next launch date were predicted to be in the low 20°s. This prompted Alan McDonald to ask his engineers at Thiokol to prepare a presentation on the effects of cold temperature on booster performance.


A teleconference was held between engineers and management from Kennedy Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, and Morton-Thiokol in Utah. Boisjoly and another engineer, Arnie Thompson, knew this would be another opportunity to express their concerns about the boosters, but they had only a short time to prepare their data for the presentation.1


Thiokol's engineers gave an hour-long presentation, presenting a convincing argument that the cold weather would exaggerate the problems of joint rotation and delayed O-ring seating. The lowest temperature experienced by the O-rings in any previous mission was 53°F, on the January 24, 1985 flight. With a predicted ambient temperature of 26°F at launch, the O-rings were estimated to be at 29°F.


After the technical presentation, Thiokol's Engineering Vice President Bob Lund presented the conclusions and recommendations. His main conclusion was that 53°F was the only low-temperature data Thiokol had for the effects of cold on the operational boosters. The boosters had experienced O-ring erosion at this temperature. Since his engineers had no low-temperature data below 53°F, they could not prove that it was unsafe to launch at lower temperatures. He read his recommendations and commented that the predicted temperatures for the morning's launch was outside the database and NASA should delay the launch, so the ambient temperature could rise until the O-ring temperature was at least 53°F. This confused NASA managers because the booster design specifications called for booster operation as low as 31°F. (It later came out in the investigation that Thiokol understood that the 31°F limit temperature was for storage of the booster, and that the launch temperature limit was 40°F. Because of this, dynamic tests of the boosters had never been performed below 40°F.)


Marshall's Solid Rocket Booster Project Manager, Larry Mulloy, commented that the data was inconclusive and challenged the engineers' logic. A heated debate went on for several minutes before Mulloy bypassed Lund and asked Joe Kilminster for his opinion. Kilminster was in management, although he had an extensive engineering background. By bypassing the engineers, Mulloy was calling for a middle-management decision, but Kilminster stood by his engineers. Several other managers at Marshall expressed their doubts about the recommendations, and finally Kilminster asked for a meeting off of the net, so Thiokol could review its data. Boisjoly and Thompson tried to convince their senior managers to stay with their original decision not to launch.


A senior executive at Thiokol, Jerald Mason, commented that a management decision was required. The managers seemed to believe the O-rings could be eroded up to one-third of their diameter and still seal properly, regardless of the temperature. The data presented to them showed no correlation between temperature and the blowby gasses which eroded the O-rings in previous missions. According to testimony by Kilminster and Boisjoly, Mason finally turned to Bob Lund and said, "Take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat."


Joe Kilminster wrote out the new recommendation and went back online with the teleconference. The new recommendation stated that the cold was still a safety concern, but their people had found that the original data was indeed inconclusive and their "engineering assessment" was that launch was recommended, even though the engineers had no part in writing the new recommendation and refused to sign it.


Alan McDonald, who was present with NASA management in Florida, was surprised to see the recommendation to launch and appealed to NASA management not to launch. NASA managers decided to approve the boosters for launch despite the fact that the predicted launch temperature was outside of their operational specifications.

 

http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-...ly-he-tried-to-stop-shuttle-challenger-launch

"Armed with the data that described that possibility, Boisjoly and his colleagues argued persistently and vigorously for hours. At first, Thiokol managers agreed with them and formally recommended a launch delay. But NASA officials on a conference call challenged that recommendation.

"I am appalled," said NASA's George Hardy, according to Boisjoly and our other source in the room. "I am appalled by your recommendation."

Another shuttle program manager, Lawrence Mulloy, didn't hide his disdain. "My God, Thiokol," he said. "When do you want me to launch — next April?"

 

http://articles.latimes.com/1986-02-22/news/mn-10534_1_morton-thiokol

Engineers Overruled

"Sources have said that 15 Morton Thiokol engineers opposed launching the Challenger because of subfreezing temperatures at Kennedy Space Center, Fla., but were overruled by four senior management executives after hours of intense discussion. The engineers believed that the extreme cold could hamper the performance of crucial seals of synthetic rubber that prevent hot gases from escaping through booster rocket seams".

"Why they were overruled and why all the pressure came to reverse their judgment is the unanswered question," said Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (D-Mich.), who has spoken with a key participant in the prelaunching discussions.


At the Kennedy Space Center, commission members Sally K. Ride, Richard P. Feynman and Robert B. Hotz interviewed officials who participated in the discussions.

It has been disclosed that several top NASA officials who decided to proceed with the flight were never told of the debate with Morton Thiokol engineers.

Team in Huntsville

Another commission team was in Huntsville, Ala., where NASA rocket operations are centered, to conduct interviews with the handful of space agency officials who participated in the debate with Morton Thiokol engineers. A third team was at a Morton Thiokol facility in Utah.

All of those interviewed are scheduled to testify before the full commission in Washington on Tuesday and Wednesday in sessions that should shed further light on the question of why NASA officials and Morton Thiokol executives ignored a unanimous opinion by the rocket engineers.



Revision A: (added pertinent information from URL story).

'Not Your Concern'
Riegle interviewed McDonald earlier this week and was told by the engineer that, at one point in the discussion, which was conducted over several hours, a NASA official told McDonald: "This is not your concern."

In fact, McDonald was empowered to sign the Morton Thiokol consent form approving the launching. He refused even after four senior executives disregarded the advice of the 15 engineers and voted to recommend a launching.

The primary concern had been how the rocket's synthetic rubber O-rings would hold up in cold weather; McDonald and other Morton Thiokol engineers cited data indicating that cold weather might alter the performance of the crucial rings when the rocket ignited, allowing gases from the propellant to escape through a seam between sections of the rocket.


Aviation Week and Space Technology reported Friday that NASA had access to studies that showed how wind coming off the shuttle's liquid fuel tank in freezing weather could make the right solid booster even colder than the ambient temperature. The usually reliable trade publication said that the space agency did not make use of the studies in deliberations on the Challenger flight.

It has since been learned that, on the morning of launching, technicians recorded temperatures as low as 7 degrees on the bottom of the right solid rocket booster.

'Cold Increased Peril'

Riegle said McDonald had told him that NASA wanted to launch no matter how cold it was--even though the danger increased by each degree that the temperature dropped. "The decision was to go, period," Riegle said. "There was no lower limit on temperature below which the launch would not take place."

According to Riegle, McDonald argued also that 30-foot seas and stiff offshore winds would make it hazardous for NASA ships to recover the reusable booster rockets. Finally, Riegle said, the engineer noted that alterations in the way the rockets were to be fired would produce additional stress on the joints.

"Why there was this incredible buildup of pressure to go at that moment and override all of these warning signals remains the central mystery here," Riegle said.***

Meanwhile, Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.) called for a Senate investigation into the decision to launch, contending that the presidential commission's inquiry is inadequate. Hollings charged that the commission lacks experienced investigators and is failing to promptly inform the public of its findings.

 

https://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/news/researchernews/rn_Colloquium1012.html


here is a research paper from the Engineering Dept of Texas A&M, rather interesting for teaching business ethics, and corporate fk ups
http://ethics.tamu.edu/Portals/3/Case Studies/Shuttle.pdf

 

https://greeneyezwinkin5.wordpress.com/groupthink-and-the-space-shuttle-challenger-disaster/


The time frame during the day when a flight could be launched had many factors to consider. There were requirements of the Orbiter and the payloads. The Challenger was limited due to providing the best lighting conditions for Spartan’s observations of Halley’s Comet. There were three postponements of the launch date that was discussed during a late afternoon management conference on January 25, 1986 in which members reviewed the weather forecast for the Kennedy area. Since the forecast was unacceptable during the launch window the countdown actions were terminated.

The day before the anticipated launch, January 27 1986, the minimum temperature was 46.0°F with an average was 51.8° F. and NASA began with fueling of the external tank at 12:30 a.m. and the Challenger crew was awakened at 5:07 a.m.; the events proceeded in a normal fashion with the crew in the shuttle by 7:56 a.m.; but around

9:00 a.m. the countdown was terminated when there appeared to be a problem with the exterior hatch handle. When the crew corrected the situation the wind had changed in turn, cancelling the flight and rescheduled for January 28, 1986.

The night before the launch had been a cold one, and frost had formed on the O-ring in question, freezing it and making it brittle with ice accumulating on the launch pad causing considerable concern for the launch team. The weather forecasted to be clear and very cold, with temperatures dropping into the low twenties overnight. In reaction, the ice inspection team was sent to the launch pad at 1:35 a.m., January 28 and returned to the Launch Control Center at 3:00 a.m.



Also, during the night, prior to fueling, a problem developed with a fire detector in the ground liquid hydrogen storage tank. Though it was ultimately tracked to a hardware fault and repaired, fueling was delayed by two and half hours. By continuing past a planned hold at launch minus three hours, however, the launch delay was reduced to one hour. The Crew was awakened at 6:18 a.m. and rescheduled. Yet, after a meeting to consider the team’s report, the Space Shuttle program manager decided to continue the countdown. Another ice inspection was scheduled at launch minus three hours.

This mission had been postponed a number of times due to irregular weather and mechanical issues. There were many reasons NASA was pressured to launch, one being the need to launch the Challenger without any delays so the launch pad could be restored in time for the next mission. It was scheduled to carry a probe that would observe Halley’s Comet. If it had launched on time, this probe would have gathered data a few days before a similar Russian probe was scheduled to be launched. NASA had much to gain from the success of flight 51-L. The “Teacher in Space” mission had generated much more press interest than other recent shuttle flights. This was an important tool which NASA used to help ensure its funding. The recent success of the Space Shuttle program had left NASA in a Catch 22 type situation. Victorious shuttle flights were no longer news since they were almost commonplace. However, launch aborts and delayed landings were more news worthy because they were much less frequent.

In addition to general publicity gained from flight 51-L, NASA undoubtedly was aware that a successful mission would play well in the White House. President Reagan had a mutual love of publicity as did NASA and was about to give a State of the Union speech.

The Challenger disaster came in an era of tighter budgets, smaller labor forces and a steady need for the space agency to validate the shuttle program. NASA had hoped sending a teacher into space to give a lesson would win back some public attention and show the routine nature of shuttle flights. Pressures developed because of the need to meet client commitments, which translated into an obligation to launch a certain number of flights per year and on time.

To retain Shuttle funding, NASA was forced to make a series of major concessions. First, facing an extremely controlled budget, NASA sacrificed the research and development essential to produce a truly reusable shuttle. Instead they accepted a design which was only partially reusable, eliminating one of the features which made the shuttle attractive in the first place. Solid rocket boosters (SRB’s) were used instead of safer liquid fueled boosters since they required a much smaller research and development effort. Numerous other design changes were made to reduce the level of research and development required.

***Before the decision to launch the Challenger, NASA held many meetings to discuss the low temperature performance of the boosters. The meeting(s) took place throughout the day and evening from 12:36 p.m., January 27, 1986 following the decision to not launch the Challenger due to high crosswinds at the launch site. Discussions continued through about 12:00 midnight via teleconferencing and Telefax systems connecting the Kennedy Space Center in Florida with engineers and management, Morton-Thiokol in Utah with several engineers and managers that were present at the table in corporate headquarters, Johnson Space Center in Houston, and the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama who was responsible for all rocket and propulsion systems.

Boisjoly and another engineer, Arnie Thompson, knew this would be another opportunity to express their concerns about the boosters, but they had only a short time to prepare their data for the presentation. No organization in the history of NASA has ever tried to stop a launch before.



The discussion surrounded the grease and the O-rings that could not handle the low temperatures and that both the primary and secondary seals would not function properly. They advised that no launches should take place below 53°F. Morton-Thiokol engineers debated for an hour presenting a persuasive argument that the cold weather would exaggerate the problems of joint rotation and delayed O-ring seating. The lowest temperature experienced by the O-rings in any previous mission was 53°F. With a predicted temperature of 26°F at launch, the O-rings were anticipated to be 29°F. After the technical presentation, Morton-Thiokol engineering Vice President Bob Lund presented the recommendations. His main focus was that 53°F was the only low temperature data Morton-Thiokol had regarding the effects of cold on the operational boosters. The boosters had experienced O-ring erosion at this temperature. Since his engineers had no low temperature data below 53°F, they could not prove that it was unsafe to launch at lower temperatures. He read his recommendations and commented that the predicted temperatures for the morning’s launch was outside the data base and NASA should delay the launch, so the temperature could rise and the O-ring temperature was at least 53°F.

This puzzled NASA managers since the booster design specifications called for booster operation as low as 31°F. Because of this, dynamic tests of the boosters had never been performed below 40°F. Marshall’s Solid Rocket Booster Project Manager, both the NASA engineers and engineers from Morton-Thiokol disagreed that under the current freezing weather conditions, it would be unsafe to launch.

During that period of time NASA’s had a safety policy in place that they called the “burden of proof.” This recognized that if someone could substantiate there is a problem, flaw, or if something is unsafe then in order to carry on they must first prove without a reasonable doubt that there is no foreseen predicament. In other words, NASA felt that an individual doesn’t have to establish that anything is unsafe, but one has to verify it was safe, before any launch was made.

This policy was distorted the night before the launch of the Challenger. Morton- Thiokol had mentioned to NASA that it was dangerous to launch under the current weather conditions because of the cold weather. NASA having never being told by a contractor not to launch became skeptical of the sudden announcement by Morton-Thiokol engineers and questioned why they were bringing up the safety issues of the O-rings.

A heated debate went on for several minutes before Joe Kilminster was asked for his opinion. Kilminster was in management, although he had an extensive engineering background and stood by his engineers. Several other managers at Marshall expressed their doubts about the recommendations, and finally Kilminster asked for a meeting off of the net, so Morton-Thiokol could review its data. Boisjoly and Thompson tried to convince their senior managers to stay with their original decision not to launch. A senior executive at Morton-Thiokol, Jerald Mason, commented that a management decision was required. Stanley Reinartz, the manager of the shuttle project office at the Marshall Spaceflight Center made the decision not to take engineer’s concerns about O-ring seals to the highest reaches of NASA management. The data presented to them showed no correlation between temperature and the blow-by gasses which eroded the O-rings in previous missions. Chris Bergin (2007) reported that according to the testimony by Kilminster and Boisjoly, Mason finally turned to Bob Lund and said, “Take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat.” Joe Kilminster wrote out the new recommendation and went back on line with the teleconference.

Morton-Thiokol was harshly chastised by NASA for expressing a launch delay. Marshall mentioned to the group that they have been flying for 5 years, with the knowledge of the conditions of the joints at cold temperatures. Things became heated between Morton-Thiokol and NASA. Morton-Thiokol provided fourteen charts at the conference trying to prove why there should not be a launch. But, to no avail and it was considered inconclusive. Faced with this extreme pressure, Morton-Thiokol management asked its engineers to reconsider their position. When the engineers stuck to their original recommendations not to fly, Morton-Thiokol management overruled them and gave NASA its approval to launch.

William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken described the situation as, “…no consensus was reached, so a “management risk decision” was made. Managers voted and engineers did not. When a Marshall administrator asked, “Does anyone have anything to add to this? No one spoke.” NASA heard silence on the phone after that, which was interpreted by them to be the green light to launch. It was actually the silence that became the sound of looming death. At 11:15 P.M. the recommendation was finalized to launch. There were no procedures to guide their dialogue; the participants automatically reverted to the centralized, hierarchical method used in Flight Readiness Reviews. The entire discussion and decision making process to launch began and ended with this group of 34 individuals.***

On January 28, 1986 the skies were clear and the sun shone brightly on an uncharacteristically cold morning at Kennedy Space Center. Roger Boisjoly questioned the feasibility of launching at these low temperatures because he knew of the effect that the cold temperature would have on the O-rings. Rockwell International primary contractor told NASA they could not guarantee the safety of the flight. The people on the launch pad explained what they saw as a scene right out of Dr. Zhivago….everything was covered with icicles. One potential problem was that if an icicle removed any of the thermal protection tiles on the orbiter, the vehicle would bum up and the astronauts would die during re-entry. From the weather situation alone and the scene at the launch pad, it was obvious that there was enough proof to stop the launching of the Challenger.

The management team directed engineers to assess the possible effects of temperature on the launch. No critical issues were identified to management officials, and while the assessment continued, it was determined that there was no sufficient evidence to prevent the proceeding of the countdown. With an extra hour, the team had more than sufficient time to consume breakfast, obtain a weather briefing and put on their flight gear. At the weather meeting, the temperature and ice on the pad were discussed, but neither then nor in earlier weather deliberations was the crew told of any apprehensions about the effects of the low temperatures. The seven crew members left the quarters and rode the astronaut van to launch pad B, arriving at 8:03 a.m.; they were in their seats in the Challenger at 8:36 a.m. The temperature at launch time was 36° degrees.

At T-6 seconds, the shuttle engines were ignited, followed by the vehicle’s solid rocket boosters. As the Challenger ascended, it encountered tremendous wind shears after liftoff. They were the worst wind shears any shuttle had ever faced. Already weakened by the cold weather the O-rings eroded; the field joint came completely out of alignment. A gap had opened through which blow-by gases could come in contact with Challenger’s external tank. The potentially fatal failure sequence was known to NASA officials before liftoff had begun.



At 56 seconds the super hot flame was burning a big hole. At 58.32 seconds, an unusual plume in the lower part of the right Solid Rocket Booster was recorded; at 58.72 seconds the first indication of smoke became visible from the right SRB. A fraction of a second later, at 58.77, the first flickering flame appeared on the right SRB in the area of the aft field joint. By 59.26, the flickering flame had grown into a continuous, well-defined cloud. At 64.66 seconds, the hydrogen tank was punctured and the hydrogen began to burn. Meanwhile, the crew was given the command to give the shuttle more power: “You are go at throttle up…” The next words heard from Challenger, was: “Roger, go at throttle up” At 72.3 seconds, it burned through the booster support. At 72.5 seconds the booster swung out from lack of support. At 73 seconds into the mission, a response was spoken from someone… most likely the pilot, Mike Smith speaking the words: “Uh-oh”. David Ellis stated in an article from Time Magazine, “The last response a NASA investigator has confirmed suspicions that the astronauts were conscious of their fate, and that among the last words from the craft were those of one astronaut saying to another, “Give me your hand.”

The crew at that moment knew of the impending danger of what lied ahead. At 73.6 seconds, everything ignited as the hydrogen and oxygen mixed and exploded. The explosion blasted the shuttle skyward at more than 1,000 MPH, but the sudden stress tore it apart as the world watched the doomed Challenger and mourned for the seven individuals who gave their lives in the name of progress.

It is in my opinion that the individuals involved in this fatal decision making process were considered a cohesive group (self-managing team) consisting of Socio-emotional and instrumental factors and there was a sense of esprit de corps within the group dynamics. They had been employed collectively for many years working toward a common goal and were familiar with each other moving up in their positions within the space shuttle program. Kreitner-Knicki (2006) described a cohesive group as being , “…a process whereby a sense of “we-ness” emerges to transcend individual differences and motives…a sense of togetherness based on emotional satisfaction…mutual dependency needed to get the job done.” (p.352) Esprit de corps is defined by Wikipedia as, “A state of mind, morale, a united sense, or feeling, of direction, conviction, spirit, and enthusiasm toward a generally positive cause or purpose.”

The organizational culture was one factor at NASA, Morton-Thiokol, Marshall Space Flight Center and Rockwell which contributed to the disaster as well as the communication patterns leading to the flawed decision making process. A second factor would be the role that leadership played in the destruction of the spacecraft and the loss of the crew member’s life.

Rockwell, the company which manufactured the Orbiter also had concerns about launching in cold and icy conditions. Their major concern was the possibility of ice from either the shuttle or the launch structure striking and damaging the vehicle. Like Morton-Thiokol, they recommended against the launch, and they too were pressed to explain their reasoning. Instead of sticking with their original strong recommendation against launch, the Rockwell team carefully worded their statement to say that they could not fully guarantee the safety of the shuttle.

In its desire to fly out its manifest, NASA was willing to accept this as a recommendation. The final decision to launch, however, belonged to Jesse Moore who was in charge of the Flight Readiness Review for NASA. He was informed of Rockwell’s concerns, but was also told that they had approved the launch. Somehow, as the warnings and concerns were communicated up each step of the latter of responsibility they became diminished.

The decision to suggest for a launch was made by lower level management officials over the objections of skilled individuals who opposed the launch under the environmental circumstances that existed on the launch pad at the time. Furthermore, the lower level managers who made this decision, both NASA and contractor personnel chose not to report the objections of the technical experts in their recommendations to higher levels in the management chain of authority to continue with the launch. Finally, it seems that the lower level managers had also received out of the ordinary demands from higher levels of management to continue with the launching of the shuttle.

This type of dysfunctional operational view of the organizations portrayed many opportunities for failure. The basic fundamentals of this process were the beginnings of failure as the groups searched for conformity and unity sacrificing everything in order to maintain peace within the groups. It is perceived that management wanted the organizations process to run without any type of questions.



I believe that Groupthink played a significant factor and major contributor to the Challenger disaster. This term referred to the preference of group members to have the same opinions and beliefs which, in this case lead to numerous errors. I.L. Janis defined Groupthink as, ”A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when members striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.” It is the sharing of false beliefs that everyone in the group agrees with its judgments. In the Report of the Presidential Commission there was a comment stating, “Morton-Thiokol became highly susceptible to Groupthink when they requested a break from the GDSS. At this point they became insulated, conducted private conversations under high stress and were afraid of losing potential future revenue should they disagree with NASA.” All these factors are considered prime to the formulation of Groupthink.

Some of the symptoms of Groupthink that lead up to this tragedy were: Overestimations of the group’s power and unquestioned morality such as believing that the group’s position is ethical/moral and that all others are inherently malevolent, closed-mindedness, mind guarding, inherent morality, rationalization, self-censorship, illusion of unanimity, pressure dissent and stereotype actions within the group. These symptoms lead to a faulty decision process among all of the organizations involved.

During the conferences concerning the option to launch appeared to be a rejection of the engineers opinions along with management’s bias of the facts presented to them. This was indicated when most of the group viewed themselves as invincible which caused them to make decisions that were at a high risk. Irving Janis described this occurrence as the illusion of invulnerability by summarizing this attitude as ‘‘Everything is going to work out all right because we are a special group.” The group had an enormous amount of confidence and authority in their decisions as well as in themselves.Two of the top three NASA officials responsible for the launch displayed a stereotyped view of the situation. They felt that they completely understood the nature of the joint problem and never seriously considered the objections raised by the MTI engineers. In fact they degraded and badgered the opposition bases on their information and opinions.

These same two officials pressured MTI to change its position after they originally recommended that the launch not take place. These two officials pressured MTI personnel to prove that it was not safe to launch, rather than to prove the opposite. This was a total reversal of normal preflight procedures. It was this pressure that top MTI management was responding to when they overruled their engineering staff and recommended launch. Pressure on dissent group members were considered direct pressure to anyone who questioned the validity of the arguments supporting a decision favored by the majority.

The self censorship group members censored themselves when they had opinions that deviated from the apparent group consensus. Janis felt that this reflected each member’s inclination to minimize their importance of the doubts and counterarguments.

The most obvious evidence of self censorship occurred when the Vice President of MTI, who had previously presented information against launch, bowed to pressure from NASA and accepted their rationalizations for launch.

Illusion of the unanimity group members were victim to Groupthink sharing an illusion of unanimity concerning judgments made by members who spoke in favor of the majority view. This symptom was caused by the false assumption that any participant who remained silent is in agreement with the majority opinion. No participant from NASA ever openly agreed with or even took sides with MTI in the discussion. The silence from NASA was amplified by the fact that the meeting was a teleconference linking the participants at three different locations. The group leader and other members supported each other by playing up points of union in their thinking at the expense of fully exploring points of divergence that might reveal unsettling problems. The group ignored obvious danger signals, being overoptimistic, and taking extreme risks.

Mind guarding group members assumed the role of guarding the minds of others in the group. They attempted to shield the group from adverse information that might destroy the majority view of the facts regarding the appropriateness of the decision. The top management at Marshall knew that the rocket casings that had been ordered to be redesigned were to correct a flaw 5 months prior to this launch. This information and other technical details concerning the history of the joint problem were withheld at the meeting. It was obvious that this group was protecting the group from negative, threatening information.



Even though there existed broad protection programs consisting of interdependent safety, reliability and quality assurance functions, I believe they were intentionally overlooked when reviewing any prospective safety issues with the Challenger. Preceding the accident however, the program became ineffective. The Report of the Presidential Commission stated, “This loss of effectiveness seriously degraded the checks and balances essential for maintaining flight safety.”

The group considered only two alternatives. No initial survey of all possible alternatives occurred during the decision making process. The Flight Readiness Review team had a launch – no launch decision to make. Other possible alternatives might have been to delay the launch for further testing, or to delay until the temperatures reached an appropriate level. The group failed to reexamine alternatives that may have been initially discarded based on early unfavorable information. Top NASA officials spent time and effort defending and strengthening their position, rather than examining the MTI position.

Members of the group tended to focus on supportive information and ignored any data that might have cast a negative light on their preferred alternative. MTI representatives repeatedly tried to point out errors in the rationale the NASA officials. Even after the decision was made, the argument continued until a NASA official told the MTI representative that it was no longer his concern.

NASA faced a variety of external and internal risks factors such as strategic risks, operational risks, financial risks, environmental risks and individual loss regarding the launch. The inherent risks in the management of these companies involved the failure in the control system. Since they were built on risks of management and control systems due to agency problems the managers were ignoring them or possibly were unaware of their existences.

The real cause of the space shuttle Challenger accident 1986 was the flawed decision making process leading to the launch of the shuttle. The flawed decision making process was not a result of an individual mistake but a multitude of individuals within a Groupthink setting.

 

...damn Matts, that's a lot of work...do you ever sleep?

 

Holy Shit Rob!!! I can't keep up with you.

 

sleep..... what's sleep....?



semper en obscuris,
Nos propriae Nocte...

still waiting on re-programming, refurbishments, modifications or decommissioning ie scrap...

 

Awesome stuff Matt's.

Working on a project now that has some serious bioethics landmines to navigate and defuse. Very helpful to revisit this lesson....Thank you sir.

 

"loss of national pride" at its worst, the kind of blow one doesn't recover from easily or in a timely manner... reckless at best.

You couldn't be more spot on with: 'failures to learn lessons pro-actively' to eliminate possible fk ups long before they can become reality. Seems to often in our society we wait and count deaths before we institute changes; ie on dangerous highways, intersections, before stop signs, or stop lights are installed, often at the cost of numerous deaths over decades.

Obvious changes were mentioned formally, and imo-required but never instituted like:

• (#1-2) Mandatory 'full fueling' of all Orbiters enabling mandatory docking with the ISS. Columbia did not have enough fuel to make it more than halfway to the ISS

• Mandatory arm inspections of insulation and other damages; incl utilization of space walks.

• NASA ordered reconfiguration of alternative insulation other than the prior use of foam material on the ET, Lockheed could not find a bonding process sufficient for alternative lighter insulation's, over 100% of the ET Surfaces. An alternative foam process was used on the lower 3/4th of the ET, but the upper 1/4, with its non-cylindrical surface designs would not allow for proper bonding with the new insulation, thus the old foam was installed/bonded. (same foam that was always a problem). Flight should of been only after this problem was corrected, even if a new tank required building from scratch. Original Foam was observed falling off the ET on 4 previous lift offs, and 2 more times unobserved during lift off, but discovered after ET recovery; prior to OV-102's catastrophe.
  
• NASA accepted a 'waiver' from Lockheed, since the process could not meet Engineering requirements. This left the same type of damaging foam on the ET, that had previously been identified as a "safety/failure of flight" The foam that punctured RCC Panel #13 was old foam, and should of been a new lighter softer insulation. "Waivers are never accepted after a flight failure on any air vehicle". This incident of accepting a waiver on a nonconforming material is unprecedented, and is another hush hush lie the public has never heard about.
  
• Tools, parts and materials to build parts, should of already been aboard the ISS, and the ISS Tool Storage additional pod should of been a part of its original configuration. This never happened until after Columbia's loss.
• Manned Escape Pods, were turned down by Congress during a NASA financial chopping period. Those pods were already formally designed, the engineering complete, and a wooden prototype on static display. Everyone agreed these were necessary for safe missions, for:

1. ISS emergency escapes.
2. Orbiter emergency return vehicles.
   
3. additional manned or unmanned uses/missions of there own (eventually), much like Space X is doing right now; yet could of been done much cheaper in the 80's, as initially planned.

• We could go on all day and night on what NASA forgot to do to ensure no shuttle should of ever met a fate that could of and should of been avoided.

What blew my mind after the 3 yr flight suspension for Challenger OV-099, and another 2 yrs suspension after OV-102 Columbia's down time, to review all launch variables, assess and eliminate high risk variables/processes, like the 'Polar Orbits'. Those polar orbits cost billions to build the west coast VAFB launch site. VAFB OV Launch facilities were 98% complete when OV-099 blew. VAFB would of gave the US the ability via polar launches, to sit over Russia and Asia, for the duration of their mission. High yield recon missions, that never got off the ground.

 

VAFB


The design above is derived from the NRO’s mission patch featuring a Phoenix rising from the ashes in a swirl of flames. There’s a long tradition that stars in such mission logo designs represent the number of like launches. Since this is the fifth Delta IV HEAVY launch – there are four stars along the left side with the fifth star atop the “L” in L-49.
Prior launches were Dec 2004 (demo/test), Nov 2007 (DSP-23), Jun 2009 (NROL-26) and Nov 2010 (NROL-32).
Another tradition goes back to the Titan program where rockets launched from the West Coast were named after women. This is partially where “BETTY” came to be. The rest of the name came from the Latin phrase “melior diabolus quem scies” Roughly translated, this means “Better The Devil You Know”… or, BETTY, the devil you know.

The wrench in Betty’s hand represents the numerous launch pad modifications that were required to convert SLC-6 affectionately known as “Slick six”.

Originally designed as a Titan III pad (1966), SLC-6 underwent major $4B changes to become a West Coast Space Shuttle launch pad (1980) scheduled to launch in 1986. This program was cancelled after the Challenger disaster. SLC-6 then was home to to an Athena II pad (1999) eventually modified to accommodate today's Delta IV pad configuration to the tune of over $100M operated by United Launch Alliance (ULA) in support of the mission.
Across the bottom of the patch reads “PRIMORIS GRAVIS EX OCCASUS” which is again Latin for “First Heavy from the West” celebrating the inaugural Western Range launch.
This Delta IV (DIV) HEAVY stands 238 feet tall and burns 3 tons of fuel and oxidizer per second!

 

I'm reading that Pence is going to get knee deep into rebuilding the space program. Back to moon and beyond, being more strategic with commercial entities.