Nuclear Attack?

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/safety-security.html

 

The anthrax by mail thing was pretty well telegraphed. People did die who first opened the mail, but it was really obvious that when you see white powder in an envelope that it's an attack.

 

5 letters infected 22 people. And like I said, it was telegraphed. When the first guy died, they knew to look out for suspicious white powder coming to people in the mail and everyone alerted to how to deal with it.

There's also the fact that it was anthrax (which we do have cures for) and it wasn't weaponized. The bio weapon of choice would be smallpox. I used anthrax as an example of a bug that's readily available (for study) and that could be made so those 93% effective vaccines would be near 0% effective.

 

30-35% of the world's population is the 2B figure I used.

You're not accounting for the genetic manipulation I described, mixing the bugs with those resistant to the vaccines.

More info here:

http://www.gulfweb.org/report/r_1_2.html

You might read the rest of the report... Saddam never used bio weapons that I know of, though there is no doubt he used chemical ones. You may note we sold him all kinds of biological items which he was apparently weaponizing, some of the details provided in the report. You may also note we didn't sell him any chemical weapons or precursors.

 

I bring up the Riegle Report because it's one of the most exhaustive studies of the massive chemical and biological programs that Saddam had, and details the various components of the biological programs WHICH WE SOLD HIM. We have direct knowledge of that, receipts, order forms, you name it. The document describes how he was working on his biological weapons program. More importantly, some of the items we sold him, under the guise of medical research purposes in the Iraqi Universities. were those resistant bugs found in hospitals.

It also describes activities like these:

http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/bk12.html

[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Bacillus anthracis, for example, essentially fulfills the military specification, although anthrax victims may be treated up to several days after exposure with antibiotics. Therefore, only a minority of the infected persons will die from an anthrax attack in circumstances where appropriate medical response is possible, as was shown by the anthrax attacks in 2001 in the USA.

[/FONT] [FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A very simple genetic intervention such as increased antibiotic resistance, however, could provoke much more deadly results by impairing timely and effective treatment. The technical possibilities for such manipulations are many, and are growing by the day. In many basic science research projects, methods to overcome current technical limitations in the military use of pathogenic agents have been demonstrated – sometimes unwittingly. Countless examples from the daily work of molecular biologists could be presented here, but one particularly interesting example is the transfer of “suntanning” genes: Many microorganisms are rapidly destroyed by bright sunshine (hence the Sunshine Project) and are thus only of limited use as a biowarfare agent. Many biological weapons are much more effectively used at night or dawn in order to avoid the destructive effect of the ultraviolet light. But “suntanning” genes may be introduced into microorganisms to confer UV resistance. In one experiment, genes coding for the synthesis of carotinoids have been transferred into harmless bacteria (Sandmann et al. 1998). Another possibility would be to engineer toxins into microorganisms that are naturally UV-protected (Manasherob et al. 2002). [/FONT]

 

And there's this, from the World Medical Association:

http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b1.htm

THE WMA DECLARATION OF WASHINGTON ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Document 17.400
Initiated: September 2001 17.400
Adopted by the WMA General Assembly, Washington 2002
Editorial Changes made during the May 2003 Council Session

INTRODUCTION

1. The World Medical Association recognizes the growing threat that biological weapons might be used to cause devastating epidemics that could spread internationally. All countries are potentially at risk. The release of organisms causing smallpox, plague, anthrax or other diseases could prove catastrophic in terms of the resulting illnesses and deaths compounded by the panic such outbreaks would generate. At the same time, there is a growing potential for production of new microbial agents, as expertise in biotechnology grows and methods for genetic manipulation of organisms become simpler. These developments are of special concern to medical and public health professionals because it is they who best know the potential human suffering caused by epidemic disease and it is they who will bear primary responsibility for dealing with the victims of biological weapons. Thus, the World Medical Association believes that medical associations and all who are concerned with health care bear a special responsibility to lead in educating the public and policy makers about the implications of biological weapons and to mobilize universal support for condemning research, development, or use of such weapons as morally and ethically unacceptable.
2. Unlike the use of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons, the consequences of a biological attack are likely to be insidious. Their impact might continue with secondary and tertiary transmission of the agent, weeks or months after the initial epidemic. The consequences of a successful biological attack, especially if the infection were readily communicable, could far exceed those of a chemical or even a nuclear event. Given the ease of travel and increasing globalization, an outbreak anywhere in the world could be a threat to all nations.
3. A great many severe, acute illnesses occurring over a short span of time would almost certainly overwhelm the capacities of most health systems in both the developing and industrialized world. Health services throughout the world are struggling to meet the demands created by HIV/AIDS and antimicrobial-resistant organisms, the problems created by civil strife, refugees and crowded, unsanitary urban environments as well as the increased health needs of aging populations. Coping over a short period of time with large numbers of desperately ill persons could overwhelm entire health systems.
4. Actions can be taken to diminish the risk of biological weapons as well as the potentially harmful consequences of serious epidemics whatever their origin. International collaboration is needed to build a universal consensus that condemns the development, production, or use of biological weapons. Programs of surveillance are needed in all countries for the early detection, identification, and response to serious epidemic disease; health education and training is needed for professionals, civic leaders, and the public alike; and collaborative programs of research are needed to improve disease diagnosis, prevention, and treatment.
5. The proliferation of technology and scientific progress in biochemistry, biotechnology, and the life sciences provides the opportunity to create novel pathogens and diseases and simplified production methods for bioweapons. The technology is relatively inexpensive and, because production is similar to that used in biological facilities such as vaccine manufacturing, it is easy to obtain. Capacity to produce and effectively disperse biological weapons exists globally, allowing extremists (acting collectively or individually) to threaten governments and endanger peoples around the world. Nonproliferation and arms control measures can diminish but cannot completely eliminate the threat of biological weapons. Thus, there is a need for the creation of and adherence to a globally accepted ethos that rejects the development and use of biological weapons.